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THE HOUSE OF THE SEVEN GABLES:
HAWTHORNE'S LEGAL STORY
BROOK THOMAS
THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
In 1851-1852 William Wetmore Story, later to become Haw
­
thorne’s friend in Rome and whose statue of Cleopatra Hawthorne
 helped make famous in The Marble Faun, published a two-volume
 account of the life and letters of his father, Justice Joseph Story, a
 distinguished professor of law at
 
Harvard, the foremost legal scholar  
of his day, and a member of the Supreme Court from
 
1811 till his death  
in 1845. Describing his father physically, he wrote: “The muscular
 action of his face was very great, and its flexibility and variety of
 expression remarkable. Its outward form and feature seemed like a
 visible text, into which every thought and emotion translated
 themselves,—a luminous veil, which moved with every vibration of
 the inward 
life.
 His face was a benediction. Through it shone a benign  
light, whose flame was fed by happy thoughts and gentle desires-
 .... while he spoke, his face was haunted by a changeful smile, which
 played around it, and flashed
 
across it with  auroral light.”1 At almost  
the same time, Hawthorne created his fictional Judge Pyncheon of
 The House of the Seven Gables who also has a variety of expression
 and a face that can be read like a visible text. When the veil is lifted on
 Judge Pyncheon’s face, however, it reveals not “the genuine benignity
 of soul, whereof it purported to be the outward reflection” but some
­thing “
cold,
 hard, immitigable, like a daylong brooding cloud” (119).
Although Hawthorne’s description could be read as a
 
response to  
Story’
s,
 the dates of  composition rule out any direct influence. Non ­
etheless, comparing the two helps us to understand
 
how deeply Haw ­
thorne’s portrayal of his judge is rooted in his times. The description of
 Story
 
is not merely that of a respectful son honoring a famous father;  
it is pervaded by the metaphors used to combat a powerful anti
­judicial sentiment in antebellum America.2 Confronted by com
­plaints from Jacksonian Democrats that judges too often made
 political decisions benefitting a wealthy elite, defenders of the profes
­sion responded with an image of the judge as
 
a disinterested defender  
of the republic’s
 
central principle, rule by law. No other national judge  
of the time, with
 
the possible exception of John Marshall, was cited as  
1
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a living monument to that principle more often than Joseph Story.
What I want to do in this essay is use the lens of Hawthorne’s
 
fiction to look at a segment of American legal history at the same time
 that I frame Hawthorne’s portrait of Judge Pyncheon within the
 period’s legal history. In the first section, I will detail Story’s partici
­pation in Salem’
s
 most famous murder case, a case Hawthorne used as  
a model for The House of the Seven Gables,
 
In the second section, I will  
look at Story’s participation in two landmark cases as a way of better
 understanding his legal
 
ideology and how Hawthorne’s fiction chal ­
lenges it. In the final section, I will examine the politics of Haw
­thorne’
s
 aesthetics, for despite a radical potential in his work,  
Hawthorne,
 
in his reaction to the same market conditions that helped  
to shape Story’
s
 conservative legal ideology, lapses into a conserva ­
tism of his own. My underlying assumption, then, is that Hawthorne’
s fiction
 
and Story’s legal opinions are  social texts, which read together  
allow a symptomatic reading of their age.3
II
The most obvious model for Judge Pyncheon remains Charles W.
 
Upham, the Salem Whig politician Hawthorne felt was responsible
 for his removal from the Custom House. But at least one of Haw
­thorne’s contemporaries recognized enough
 
allusions to Justice Story  
to write on the flyleaf of a first edition of The House of the Seven
 Gables:
There seems no doubt that Hawthorne, from some pique or other,
 
has to a sufficient extent to have annoyed Judge Story not a little,
 had
 
he lived to read these pages, though not enough to ground an  
action of libel on, introduced very unpleasant allusions to the late
 Mr. Justice Story in this volume. We know that in preceding work,
 Mr. H. treated some very respectable old people in Salem, who had
 incurred his displeasure, in a similar way; & there is therefore
 nothing strange in this attack. Probably, Mr. H. having been a
 Revenue officer in the district of which Judge Story had jurisdic
­tion, some
 
ill-feeding arose out of their official intercourse. These  
instances, of a vague, indefined resemblance, are numerous,
 though unconnected as a whole. There was never in N. England
 that I can learn of, but
 
one Pyncheon family  and almost the last  
(female) descendant of it, Judge Story married. Judge Story & a
 Mr. Crowninshield were nephews of the late Mr. White, a wealthy
 gentleman of Salem whom the latter murdered by night, destroy
­ing his will &c. (see p. 335) Crowninshield was hung, however. The
2
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sketches in Ch. VIII.4
That a contemporary would think of Justice Story when reading
 
about Judge Pyncheon is not surprising. Story was after all, like
 Hawthorne, a Salem man and its most famous judge. His
 
first wife,  
who died
 
shortly after their marriage, was indeed a descendant of the  
Pynchon family which felt so unfairly attacked by Hawthorne’s use of
 its name in his fiction. Story’
s
 second wife, the daughter of Judge  
William Wetmore, was a distant relative of his first. An equally inter
­esting observation is that the connections between Story and Judge
 Pyncheon are too vague to ground an action of libel. First of all, it
 explains why, even if it were my main purpose to do so, I could not
 establish conclusive evidence for the connection. Second, it suggests a
 pattern we repeatedly find in Hawthorne’s fiction. At the same time
 that he suggests a historical connection, he uses the cover of his fiction
 to make certain that he could never be convicted of making it. His book
 is, after all, a romance not a real history, “having a great
 
deal to do  
with the clouds overhead, than any portion of
 
the actual soil of  the  
County of Essex” (3).
So warned, readers continue to return to the history of the county
 
of Essex to understand Hawthorne’
s
 fiction, and the murder of Cap ­
tain Joseph White in 1830
 
is a part of that history often cited. George  
Parsons Lathrop, Hawthorne’s son-in-law, wrote in his introduction
 to The House of the Seven Gables: “In all probability Hawthorne
 connected with [the Pyncheon murder], in his mind, the murder of 
Mr. White....”5 Thus, our contemporary reader’s 
allusion to the trial is not  
unusual. Nor is it unusual, given the sensational aspects of the case,
 that he himself offers a fictionalized account of the case, an account
 influenced no doubt by his reading of Hawthorne’s fiction. As we shall
 see, Story and Crowninshield were involved, but they were not
 nephews of the victim.
The White murder
 
case has been described by someone not inter ­
ested in making a point about Hawthorne as resurrecting “in the early
 years of the Nineteenth Century the apparatus of the Eighteenth
 Century romance.”6 In April 1830, Captain White, a
 
rich Salem mer ­
chant on whose ships Hawthorne’s father had served, was found
 murdered in
 
his bed. The town was in an uproar, fearing that life and  
property of respectful citizens were no longer safe. A committee of
 vigilance was formed, made up of twenty-seven leading citizens. Its
 vigorous pursuit of the murderers added to the climate of crisis, as
 critics recalled the witch hunts two hundred years earlier. Some sus
­
3
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pected White’s servants who reported the murder. Some thought that
 
White, eighty-two, had been involved in a love affair and was the
 victim
 
of a jealous rival. Others speculated that a Black committed the  
crime in revenge for the large profits White had made from the African
 slave trade. Even White’s lawyers were suspected. Eventually, two
 sets of brothers, the black sheep of two prominent Salem families,
 Frank and Joseph Knapp and Richard and George Crowninshield,
 were accused of the murder.
Three years earlier, Joseph Knapp, a captain of one of White’
s 
ships, had married Mary Beckford, the
 
beautiful daughter of White’s  
niece and long-time housekeeper. Accusing Knapp of fortune hunting,
 White had removed him from command and cut his favorite Mary out
 of his will. Mistakenly believing that, if the will of Captain White
 could be destroyed, his mother-in-law would
 
inherit half the fortune,  
Knapp hired Richard Crowninshield to murder White while Knapp,
 still having the run of the house, would steal the will. Crowninshield
 executed the murder, and Knapp did steal a
 
document, but the wrong  
one. White’s real will was kept safe by his lawyers. In the real will the
 major inheritor of a great fortune was the once-suspected nephew
 Stephen White, a Massachusetts State Senator and also Joseph Sto
­ry’
s
 brother-in-law.
Although Story had a personal
 
stake in the trial, he stayed to the  
background as controversy about the case made news throughout the
 country. What he did do was arrange for his friend, Daniel Webster, to
 aid the prosecution. Thus, the White case involved an alliance that
 was one of the shaping
 
forces in antebellum law,  an alliance combin ­
ing the oratorical skill of Webster and the legal expertise of Story.
 Because of numerous complications, including Joseph Knapp’s con
­fession in exchange for immunity, the suicide of Richard Crownin
­shield, the death of presiding Chief Justice Parker by apoplexy, and
 Joseph’s loss of immunity by refusing to testify at his brother’s trial,
 all of the power of that alliance was needed to bring about a
 conviction.
Indeed Webster was given personal credit for the conviction of
 
Frank and Joseph Knapp, George Crowninshield having been
 granted
 
an acquittal. His concluding speech at Frank’s trial has been  
called “the greatest ever delivered to an American jury.” Not all of
 those impressed by its power were impressed by its fairness. One critic
 went 
so
 far as to call Frank’s conviction “an example of judicial  
murder.”7
 
Enough Salem residents were outraged at Webster for help-
4
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ing to hang two members of
 
a prominent Salem family that he was  
never again warmly welcomed in their town. Others were understand
­ably upset at the irregularity of having Webster brought in from
 outside to serve the prosecution, especially
 
since, contrary to his offi ­
cial denial, he was paid
 
$1,000 by Story’s brother-in-law, the same fee  
paid to Crowninshield to commit the murder. Salem residents would
 also have known that Webster, who stayed at White’
s
 home during the  
trial, received a gift of a yacht from White, that the half-brother of
 Webster’s first wife married one of Story’s nieces, and that Webster’s
 son married another. That
 
Webster  was allowed to argue the case for  
the prosecution seems even more unfair when we remember that
 Robert Rantoul, the young Jacksonian Democrat who would later
 battle Story over the codification of Massachusetts law, served as
 assistant for the defense, but contrary to the defendants’ wishes, was
 not allowed to argue their case because he was not a member of court.
 The Webster v. Rantoul opposition points to a possible political aspect
 of
 
the case that historical distance too often lets us forget.
As any resident of Salem would have known, Story might have
 had more interest in this case than his nieces’ inheritance. Early in his
 life he had been an ally of the Crowninshields, a rising merchant
 family which joined the Jeffersonian party to challenge the
 staunchly-Federalist merchant establishment in Salem. But the
 alliance had turned sour. In 1808 Story maneuvered a Crowninshield
 out of a seat in Congress. Further, if the local Salem diarist Dr.
 William Bentley can be
 
trusted, Story had risen in the State house by  
depriving the same Crowninshield of the speakership and had
 replaced him as president of the Salem Merchants Bank. Bentley
 referred to Story, the man later honored as an impartial lover of
 justice, as “the Ambitious wretch.” Even in his role as judge, Story
 continued to be involved in Crowinshield family affairs.
 
In 1817 he sat  
on the Supreme Court as
 
it decided the bankruptcy case of Sturgis v.  
Crowninshield, disallowing a Crowninshield’s attempt to discharge
 past debts. Other ways in which Story might have antagonized the
 Crowninshields are suggested in a letter from Mrs. Crowninshield to
 her husband, the Secretary of the Navy in Washington: “Yesterday
 afternoon I had the pleasure of seeing Judge Story....He told me you
 may be home
 
in May....He likewise says you have fine times with the  
girls in the house...[I also understand there are] so many ladies that
 almost every night you send for music and dance. Now you have never
 told me this and I have many times asked you how evenings you
 
5
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sometimes recollect you have a wife at home peering over her knitting
 
and two daughters studying their lessons
 
by her side” (Dunne, 158).  
Finally, as the 1830 trial proceeded, another Crowninshield lost his
 race for Congress, the outcome probably affected by publicity from the
 trial.
In all of this Hawthorne could hardly have been a neutral
 
observer: the Crowninshields were his distant cousins. Nonetheless,
 he does not appear to have been too upset. In a letter to his relative
 John Dike, he does not
 
mention  the Crowninshields at  all and, as to  
the Knapps, he writes: “For my part, I wish Joe to be punished, but I
 should not be very sorry if Frank were to escape.” For my part, I do not
 want to suggest that Story had evil motives, although his role in
 hiring Webster does raise ethical problems. The most obvious interpre
­tation of Story’s low profile during the trial is that he wanted to
 maintain judicial integrity
 
by avoiding public  involvement in a case  
personally affecting his relatives. If he had wanted to be certain of
 influencing the case, he had a perfect opportunity. Governor Levi
 Lincoln offered him Isaac Parker’
s
 seat as Chief Justice. Story  
refused, however, citing fears that President Jackson would choose
 his successor to the United States Supreme Court. Instead, after con
­sulting with Webster, Lincoln decided upon Lemuel Shaw, later to
 become Herman Melville’
s
 father-in-law. Shaw reluctantly accepted  
the post he would occupy for thirty
 
years, but he disqualified himself  
from sitting on the White case because he had served as the attorney
 for one of those suspected before the Knapps and the Crowninshields
 were arrested.
What is important in terms of Hawthorne’s use of the White
 
murder case is not to assert, almost certainly incorrectly, that a fa
­mous judge committed wrong-doings to reap personal gain and to get rid
 of past
 
enemies, but to suggest how Hawthorne’ s imagination trans ­
formed historical material into a fictional account of a dispute
 between and within two Salem familes. As we examine that transfor
­mation, it is wise to keep in mind Hawthorne’s warning to read his
 work as
 
a romance, not history—a warning echoed by George Parsons  
Lathrop who cautions, “that such resemblances as these between
 sundry elements in the work of Hawthorne’
s
 fancy and details of  
reality are only fragmentary, and are rearranged to suit the author’
s purposes.” In fact, it is precisely the political implications of that
 rearrangement along with Hawthorne’
s
 desire to deny the  historical  
ground of his fiction that concern 
me.
6
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When Hawthorne
 
first makes obvious use of the White murder in  
his fiction the result is a story quite different from his later romance.
 In “Mr Higginbotham’s Catastrophe” (1834) the murder of a rich
 merchant is plotted by three men: a white, a Black, and an Irish
 servant. The first two lose courage, leaving the Irishman alone to
 commit the deed. The hero of the story interrupts him, saves the
 merchant, and marries the rich and beautiful young niece. In recalling
 the original suspicion directed against a Black or a servant as White’
s murderer, Hawthorne’s tale confirms the racial and class prejudices of
 elite Salem. His use of material from the White case in The House of
 the Seven Gables is both more accurate and more radical.
Some points of similarity between the romance and the historical
 
accounts of the murder are obvious.
 
Unlike in the short story, where a  
servant
 
plots a murder against a rich man, in  the romance, as in the  
Salem murder, the alleged plot occurs within the rich man’s family
 and is over inheritance. Instead of the poor committing crimes against
 the propertied, the propertied commit crimes against the poor. In
 addition, there is
 
the confusion of wills and lost documents. There is  
the possibility of
 
a niece inheriting a large fortune. There is a judge  
who dies of apoplexy. There is the possibility
 
of someone avoiding a  
stiffer penalty because of “the
 
high respectability and political influ ­
ence of the criminal’s connection” (22). And, of course, there is Judge
 Pyncheon, who like Justice Story presides over meetings of bank
 directors, who like Justice Story has considerable financial invest
­ments,
 
and who like Justice Story is not above using the law to protect  
his private interests.
But to understand better why one of Hawthorne’s contemporaries
 
felt that Story would have been so upset by Hawthorne’s portrayal of
 Judge Pyncheon, we need to go beyond the Salem murder case and
 look at a part of legal history in which Story actively participated as a
 judge. These cases comprising this history are not as attractive to a
 writer of romances as a sensational murder case, and there is no
 reason to assume that Hawthorne knew more about them than the
 average educated New Englander. To be sure, he might have dis
­cussed some of the cases with his trusted friend, George Hillard, who
 along with Charles Sumner was Story’s most prized pupil. But the
 point is not to prove Hawthorne’
s
 knowledge of specific cases. The  
point is that looking at these
 
cases makes Story’ s opinions on the law  
accessible to us and lets us see the legal ideology against which
 Hawthorne was reacting. One of the most important cases Story sat
 
7
Thomas: The House of the Seven Gables: Hawthorne’s Legal Story
Published by eGrove, 1987
256 HAWTHORNE’S LEGAL STORY
on was Dartmouth College v. Woodwrd (1819).
III
The Dartmouth College Case arose over a dispute between the
 
college and the state legislature. The legislature had amended the
 school’s charter to make it more responsive to state needs in a manner
 similar to Jefferson’s proposed University of Virginia. Powerful
 members of the college wanted to preserve its elite, private nature.
 With Webster arguing the case for the trustees, the U. S. Supreme
 Court held the Dartmouth Act invalid under the impairment-of-
 contracts clause of the Constitution.
The case was welcomed by the rising commercial class because it
 
established the principle
 
of the vested rights of corporations. Corpora ­
tions of all kinds could appeal to their original charters as sacred
 contracts under the law not to be altered by legislative attempts to
 control them. Significantly, it was Story’
s
 concurring opinion, not  
Marshall’
s
 opinion of court, that explicitly extended this corporate  
privilege to private business enterprises.
What accounts of the case too often leave out is Story’s personal
 
stake in the outcome of Dartmouth 
College.
 In a preliminary ruling on  
the cas , Story was careful
 
to make a clear distinction between public  
and private corporations, since a better case
 
could be made for legisla ­
tive control over public corporations than private ones:
[A] bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private
 
corporation, although...its objects and operations partake of a
 public nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance,
 canal, bridge, and turnpike companies. In all these cases, the uses
 may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations are
 private...(Dunne, 181)
What Story did not
 
mention was  that the Merchants Bank, of which  
he was president, perfectly fit this description. Nor did he mention
 that Harvard College, to whose board of overseers he had just been
 appointed, would be protected from legislative interference by the
 Dartmouth College decision.
Modern readers immediately recognize a conflict of interests. But
 
Gerald Dunne, one of Story’
s
 biographers, warns us  against applying  
our own standards to Judge Story. “No one,” he writes, “seemed
 particularly concerned that Story held both judicial and corporate
 office” (Dunne, 141). Story’s ability simultaneously to hold positions
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as judge and bank president depended on the widespread belief at the
 
time in a guardian class
 
of virtuous, disinterested men who could keep  
public and private interests separate.
Justice Story firmly believed that “There can be no freedom where
 
there is no safety to property.” It was the task of the guardian class
made up of
 
disinterested lawyers and judges to protect the rights of  
property against those forces which would violate
 
them.  To Story, the  
major threat to property was the legislature: “That government can
 scarcely be deemed free, where the rights of property are left solely
 upon the will of a legislative body, without restraint.”11 Dartmouth
 College was such a triumph for his principles because it reaffirmed
 judicial over legislative
 
control  of the economy. In  a letter to Chancel ­
lor James Kent after the decision, he wrote, “Unless I am very
 
much  
mistaken, these principles will be found to apply with an extensive
 reach to all the great concerns of the people, and will check any undue
 encroachments upon civil rights, which the passions or the popular
 doctrines of the day may stimulate our State Legislatures to adopt.”12
 In asserting the power of the rational, impartial guardian class to rule
 over the irrational, partial masses as represented by state legislatures,
 Dartmouth College had helped to solve the
 
basic problem of govern ­
ment as
 
Story saw it: “how the property-holding part of the Commun ­
ity may be sustained against the inroads of poverty and vice.”13
Hawthorne’
s
 fictional work radically challenges  Story’ s vision of  
a just society because it questions the existence of a specially-trained,
 professional elite that can disinterestedly uphold the law. Vice in The
 House of the Seven Gables is not coupled with poverty, but with
 property. The guardian class is as irrational and partial as the popu
­lar masses. Recalling the witch trials, the book’s narrator remarks:
 “The influential classes, and those who take upon themselves to be
 leaders of the people,
 
are fully liable to all the passionate error that has  
ever characterized the maddest mob” (8). Judges, if we are to judge
 from Judge Pyncheon, seem especially inclined to let
 
personal ambi ­
tion sway their judgments. And judges, if we are to judge from Justice
 Story, seem especially inclined to minimize the passionate error of
 judges by appealing to universal legal principles. In a lecture at Salem
 in 1828 on the Puritans, Story argued that behind the irrationality of
 the witch trials lay beliefs “which had the universal sanction
 
of their  
own and all former
 
ages;...which the law supported by its mandates,  
and the purest judges felt no compunctions in enforcing.”14
Of course modern readers do not need Hawthorne to point out that
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the guardian class is not as disinterested as it claims. Without having
 
first read The House of the Seven Gables, we can still, I hope, note
 
the  
contradiction when—on the page after Story’
s
 most sympathetic legal  
biographer praises him for believing in “an independent guardian
 class of virtuous lawyers and judges”—he details the subtle manner in
 which Story used Webster “to influence Congress to enact legislation
 favorable to his conservative designs.”15 What Hawthorne’s fiction
 can do, however, is offer an alternative to the legal history we are often
 told. For instance, Story’
s
 other biographer defends the Story-Webster  
alliance by arguing that it was an accepted practice: “It should be
 emphasized that the relationship was compatible with then contem
­porary standards for judicial interests and behavior. No one was
 particularly scandalized by Webster’s legislative activity on Story’s
 behalf, nor by Webster’s action in requesting Story’s intercession with
 the reconstituted New Hampshire court to secure a clerkship for an
 associate”
 
(Dunne,  161). What Hawthorne’s fiction shows is that some  
contemporaries were indeed scandalized by the guardian class’s claim
 of judicial impartiality when judges continually made decisions
 benefitting the class to which they belonged. In fact, Hawthorne’
s Judge Pyncheon even suggests the Story-Webster alliance, since the
 Judge has resemblances not only to Story, but also, as Henry Nash
 Smith has pointed out, to Webster.16 Certainly, the Judge’s political
 aspirations draw attention to the contradiction
 
involved when Story  
and his friends claimed that the Jacksonian call for elected judges
 would politicize the judiciary.
Nonetheless, Story’
s
 inability to see that his notion of  the judi ­
ciary was as politicial as the Jacksonians’ was the result of neither
 stupidity nor willful deceit. It results from the radical separation
 between the public and private spheres accepted by most people of
 that time—Democrats and Whigs alike. Defenders of the impartiality
 of the judiciary were not so naive as to believe that judges were
 without private beliefs or interests. But they did believe that when a
 man delivered his public opinions as a judge he could, to a large extent,
 suppress his private opinions. Similarly, private business matters
 could be kept separate from public policy matters. What is important
 to see is that the same distinction between private and public which
 justified Story’s judicial impartiality was written into American
 
cor ­
porate law by Story himself. The result is not at all impartial.
Under traditional common law, private corporations with a pub
­
lic function were bound by so many charter obligations to the state
 
10
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and public as to make them as much an instrument of common welfare
 
as a vehicle for private enterprise. But with the transformation in
 America from an agrarian to a market economy, the status of the
 corporation changed. In underdeveloped America bridges, turnpikes,
 and canals needed to be built to help develop the land. In a capital-poor
 country, public funds were not easy to find. The solution was to
 transform common law to meet the demands of
 
a dynamic, market  
economy. Traditional common law, based on a static agrarian econ
­omy, favored the maintenance of the status quo by holding to the
 principle that the
 
first owner in  time was  the first in right. But in the  
first years of the nineteenth century, property laws were reinterpreted
 to favor the first developer. Most notably, special privileges were
 granted to new corporations so that private investors would risk
 capital in projects beneficial to the entire public. The principle of the
 vested rights of corporations established in Dartmouth College was
 felt to be essential to the welfare of the country by pro-development
 people such as Story because it assured investors of the legal conse
­quences of their investment. Once the terms of a charter were estab
­lished, they could not be altered, no matter how the economic situation
 might change.
The problem with the second stage was that it could discourage
 
further development by granting too many privileges to the first
 developer. Too
 
often public-service organizations turned into private,  
profit-making organizations, making the theory justifying their spe
­cial favors outdated. Under the new conditions, Story’s distinction
 between public and private gave such corporations the benefits of a
 public corporation without its obligations. Thus, just as the old agrar
­ian laws had favored those already possessing wealth, so, after an
 initial redistribution of wealth, did the new laws. As a result, the law
 was once again reinterpreted and transformed, this time to encourage
 competition by undermining the privileges granted a generation
 earlier.17
The case pointed to as marking the transformation from the
 
second stage of law to the third is Charles River Bridge v. Warren
 Bridge (1837). The extent to which Story served the interests of those
 who benefitted from the second stage is clear when 
we
 compare his  
involvement in this case
 
to his involvement in Dartmouth College, In  
1785 the state of Massachusetts had granted
 
a corporation an almost  
exclusive franchise to build a toll bridge across the Charles River.
 
By  
1827, it was collecting tolls of $30,000 a year. In an effort to spark
 
11
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competition, the legislature chartered the new Warren Bridge Com
­
pany, which promised to be toll free in six years. The Charles River
 Bridge, loosely connected with Story’
s
 Harvard College, claimed that  
the new bridge violated its charter and hired Webster to argue its case
 when it went to the Supreme Court in 1837. But this time Webster lost,
 and Story was forced to
 
write a dissenting opinion. The opinion of the  
new Jacksonian Chief Justice Taney sounded to Story much like
 Holgrave’
s
 reforms would have sounded to Judge Pyncheon. Just as  
Holgrave proposes that each generation should be able to restructure
 society to serve its present interests, so Taney ruled that considera
­tions of public interests at the present time could
 
overrule the original  
conditions of a corporate charter. Story’s defense of the sanctity of
 contract, on the other hand, recalls the Pyncheons’ desire to have the
 present generation bound by the wills of the past.
Story took his defeat hard. He wrote to his wife,
 
“A case of grosser  
injustice...never existed. I feel humiliated” (Dunne, 360). That the
 highest court in the land had agreed to give up its regulatory control to
 state legislatures seemed to Story a threat to the republic. His gloom
 was confirmed even before the Court adjourned for the year when the
 Panic of 1837 swept the country.
 
These  public setbacks along with the  
confirmation of a permanent illness to his wife caused Story to con
­sider retiring from the bench and withdrawing to full-time teaching or
 private business. In the public sphere Jacksonian policies seemed to
 have triumphed, and America seemed to have given itself over to
 irrational control.
Hawthorne once again challenges Story’
s
 political vision, which  
saw Jacksonian policies as the threat to the country. He does 
so
 by  
offering an alternative to the version of history Story adheres to.
 Although Story defended his legal principles as eternal, Hawthorne,
 by recording the three stages in the transformation of American
 property law with remarkable accuracy, shows that some of those
 principles were of fairly recent origin. According to Hawthorne’s fic
­tionalized Salem history, the country was founded on the agrarian
 principle of 
“
first in time makes first in right,” a principle giving  
Matthew Maule the right to his land, land he has cleared with his own
 hands. That original agrarian principle is violated, however, when
 Colonel Pyncheon asserts his power in order to take over Maule’s land,
 just as the rising commercial class manipulated the law to increase its
 power. The clearly established ascendancy of the Pyncheons marks
 the start of a new era
 
similar to the new era marked by the changeover  
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in the presidency of Salem’s Merchants Bank. “Our Merchant’
s 
Bank,
”
 lamented Dr. Bentley, “by passing from the Crowninshield  
interest to the Story...has not the same friends” (Dunne, 142). Thus,
 Hawthorne’s portrayal of how the Pyncheons first bend the law to
 accumulate property and then appeal to it to protect their property
 might have reminded historically—aware residents of Salem of how
 Story and his allies used a rhetoric about the eternal sanctity of
 property rights to protect property only recently acquired. Contrary to
 Story’s version of history, then, Hawthorne’s version allows us to
 
see  
the Jacksonian threat to the propertied class not
 
as a threat to basic  
American values, but as an attempt to return to America’
s
 original  
agrarian values, just as the radical reformer Holgrave threatens to
 return the Pyncheon property to its rightful owners. There is, to be
 sure, a certain nostalgia for a democratic, agrarian America that
 never really existed in this version of American history, a nostalgia
 also found in Jacksonian politics.18 Nonetheless, Hawthorne’s history
 does place Story’s claim that he was protecting eternal rights in
 proper perspective and would clearly have upset the judge, just as
 Hawthorne’s explanation of public interests in terms of private ones
 would have done.
In his portrayal of Judge Pyncheon, Hawthorne makes it clear
 
that public and private interests are connected, that merely keeping
 one’s beliefs private does not mean that they do
 
not affect one’ s public  
role. For Hawthorne, to know the public man one must know the
 private man:
As regards the Judge Pyncheon of to-day, neither clergyman, nor
 
legal critic, nor inscriber of tombstones, nor historian of general or
 local politics, would venture a word against this eminent person’s
 sincerity as a Christian, or respectability as a man, or integrity as
 a judge, or courage and faithfulness as the oft-tried representative
 of
 
his political party. But, besides these cold, formal, and empty  
words of the chisel that inscribes, the
 
voice that speaks, and the  
pen that writes for the public eye and for a distant time—and
 which inevitably lose much of their truth and freedom by the fatal
 consciousness of so doing—there were traditions about the ances
­tor, and private diurnal gossip about the Judge, remarkable
 
accord ­
ant in their testimony. It is often instructive to take the woman’s,
 the private and domestic view, of
 
a public man. (122)
But if Hawthorne’s emphasis on the private undercuts Story’
s 
ideology of disinterested public service, it reflects another ideology of
 the time, one shared by most of the period’
s
 writers. Public questions  
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for Hawthorne can almost always be explained by reducing them to a
 
private, individual level. For him, to write for the public eye inevitably
 involves distortion. Truth is
 
to be found in the private. So, two years  
later when he took up “the pen that writes for the public 
eye 
and for a  
distant time” to compose the campaign biography of Franklin Pierce,
 he emphasized his intimate knowledge of his old friend’s private
 character. For Hawthorne, politics was basically not a question of
 issues, but of character.19
In The House of the Seven Gables, for instance, the corruption
 
Hawthorne exposes in Salem can be explained by the corrupt heart of
 Judge Pyncheon or the
 
private greed of the small group  of politicians  
who would nominate him governor. When the Judge suddenly dies,
 Maule’s curse is magically lifted and the book can come to what seems
 to be a happy
 
ending. Thus, while Hawthorne condemns  his Puritan  
ancestors who participated in
 
the  witch trials, he retains their world ­
view that explains social contradiction in terms of a conspiracy the
­ory. If 
we
 turn once again to my comparison between Justice Story  
and Judge Pyncheon, we can see how inadequate this view is. Even
 though Justice Story served the same elite interests as Judge Pyn
­cheon and, like him, may have
 
disguised personal ambition behind  a  
benevolent smile, he was not evil. He might not have radiated the light
 his son claimed, but he did not
 
have a heart which, like Judge Pyn
cheon’s, threw “a great black shadow over everything” (306). The way
 in which judges, even honorable ones, can help perpetuate social
 injustice needs a more complex explanation than Hawthorne’s fiction
 can provide, for ultimately Hawthorne diverts our attention from the
 historical perspective his romance offers to an exploration of the
 universal character of the human heart, including his own.
No matter how telling Hawthorne’s criticism of the legal profes
­
sion’s ideology might be, it loses some of its power because Haw
­thorne, the judger of judges, in his heightened self-consciousness
 hints that he is not exempt from his own criticisms. If
 
judges, like  
Story, relied on a distinction between the public and private self, so did
 Hawthorne, who referred to his fiction as a veil covering his private
 self. It was, he pleaded, the public self that readers should judge.
 Hawthorne’s image of the self he
 
tried to sell to the public shares an  
important similarity with the public image judges
 
tried to project. In  
antebellum America judges were not the only professionals claiming
 to be above the squabbles of local politics; artists made the same
 claim. Hawthorne, in fact, made precisely this claim in protesting his
14
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dismissal from the Custom House. Appointed an artist, he should not,
 
he felt, be the victim of petty politics.20 Yet, as readers of “The Custom-
 House
”
 and The House of  the Seven Gables knew and should know,  
Hawthorne’s works can be very political on a local and even, I have
 argued,
 
national level. Nonetheless, like Judge Pyncheon, Hawthorne  
conceals his politics behind a public role. Also like Judge Pyncheon,
 Hawthorne covers up a gloomy
 
disposition by putting forth a sunny  
face to the public in The House of the Seven Gables, And that forced
 sunshine, like the Judge’s sunny smile, is in part motivated by com
­mercial interests, as Hawthorne, hopeful of increased sales, tried to
 open up commerce in both senses of the word with his consuming
 public.21
The way in which both artists and judges reacted to the conditions
 
of the new marketplace explains Hawthorne’s similarities with his
 judge better than any universal theory about the darkness of the
 human heart, for as much as
 
Hawthorne distrusted Story’s guardian  
class of lawyers and judges, he distrusted the class about to replace it
 even more. In fact, the major inaccuracy in Hawthorne’
s
 version of  
history is that the values of the class to replace the Pyncheons would
 not be the somewhat nostalgic and idealized agrarian values of
 Phoebe and Holgrave, but ones even more acquisitive and selfish than
 those of the Whig elite, values represented
 
by the young consumer of  
cookies, Ned Higgins.
IV
Describing why Story’s position as a bank president exemplified
 
the transformation of economic orders, Dunne offers a valuable des
­cription of the new market conditions that both judges and artists had
 to face:
The rise of banking cut the fabric of tradition with an especial
 
sharpness. Though the significance of the change was barely
 grasped and rarely articulated, the
 
growing  importance of bank ­
ing amounted to a revolution in the traditional system of credit,
 which forced profound changes in outlook and values. Sharply
 challenged were the old agrarian views under which gold and
 silver, like fields and flocks, were the true essence of wealth.
 Rather, wealth was changing in form to the intangible—to paper
 bank notes, deposit entries on bank ledgers, shares in banks, in
 turnpikes, in canals, and in insurance companies. More impor
­tant, perhaps, debt was no
 
longer necessarily the badge of improv-
15
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idence and misfortune. And from the creditor’
s
 point of view debt, in the form of  
bank notes or bank deposits, became an instrument of power. (Dunne, 142-143)
In the new economy, the old theory that value was determined by
 
the
 
inherent properties of an object gave way to a subjective theory of  
value, in which the value of an object was determined by laws of
 supply and demand. In capital-poor but
 
land-rich America, the  land  
itself became just another commodity, fluctuating in value
 
according  
to market conditions, the enterprise of developers, and the confidence
 games of speculators.22 That in The House of the Seven Gables deeds
 and wills become as important as possession of the land itself in
 determining ownership is one way Hawthorne’s fiction reflects the
 new economic reality in which paper documents and notes become the
 measure of
 
wealth and power.
Since they could use the new system of credit to gain power,
 Justice Story and his allies, like the Pyncheons, initially benefitted
 from this new
 
order. It was their enemies the Jacksonians, with their  
legacy of Jeffersonian agrarianism, who were most nostalgic about
 the lost theory of value and who responded with an attack on the
 Monster Bank. But even Story could not be comfortable with a subjec
­tive theory of value. It made the economic situation too unpredictable.
 If the market were, as Karl Polanyi terms it, “artificial,”23 any cun
­ning person might wrest wealth from those in power, a possibility
 thoroughly explored in Melville’s The Confidence Man, in which legit
­imate selling becomes indistinguishable from artful swindling. For
 Story, the answer to the instability of the marketplace was to be found
 in the monumental quality of the law, just as the Pyncheons sought an
 answer to the flux of time in monumental buildings. Constructed
 according to the solid eighteenth-century values of perspicuity, ele
­gance, and logic, the law was to provide a firm foundation to order an
 economy which seemed to defy all laws because its only
 
control was  
the
 
formless passions of the masses. Most important in a time of flux,  
the edifice of the law housed eternal truths. Lawyers
 
and judges were  
of the guardian class, because, specially trained in the law, which
 Story granted the status of a science, they had privileged access to
 those eternal truths.
Hawthorne, of course, reminds us that the legal system’s founda
­
tion was not so stable, that its science was not so rational, and that—if
 the Pyncheons’ commercial transactions are an example—its defini
­tion of legitimate commerce was not so just. Nonetheless, judges of the
 period were not the only ones to react to the new economic conditions
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by seeking eternal truths. If public law did not house stable truths,
 
they must be sought elsewhere. Commercial times, Emerson argued in
 “The Transcendentalists”
 
give rise to Idealism.24 Caught in a market  
economy which rendered the value of things subjective, turned Nature
 itself into a
 
commodity, and seemed beyond man’s ability  to control,  
men needed to seek stable truths in transcendental laws. For Emerson
 it was the imaginative artist’
s
 special role to see those transcendental  
truths, just
 
as for Story it was the trained lawyer’s to discover eternal  
truths in the law.
By making
 
this comparison, I do not want to minimize the differ ­
ence between the Transcendentalists and the legal profession.
 Although Story started his career as a poet and continued to write
 poetry all of his life and although he strongly urged his law students to
 study literature as a source of
 
eternal truths, he was uncomfortable  
with nineteenth-century poets. His models were the eighteenth
­century figures of Pope and Johnson, whose balance and reason
 expressed “truth,” not the “ideal sketches of the imagination”25 of
 modem poets. Story’s eternal
 
truths were “public”; the Transcenden
talists’ “private.” But
 
despite their  differences, both  Story and Emer ­
son’s social visions depended on keeping the public sphere separate
 from the private. Story wrote a poem called “The Power of Solitude”
 and then embarked on a public career. Emerson, finally bringing
 himself to talk on the Fugitive Slave Act, starts his speech: “I do not
 often speak to public questions;—they are odious and hurtful, and it
 seems like meddling or leaving your work.”26 To compare Haw
­thorne’
s
 conservative Judge Pyncheon with his radical artist Hol-  
grave is to
 
discover the hidden affinities between judge and artist that  
I have suggested.
Holgrave, who champions change and flux, would seem to be the
 
total opposite of Judge Pyncheon, who shares the lawyer’s love of
 order and stability. Holgrave’s friends—“reformers, temperance
­lecturers, and all manner of cross-looking philanthropists”—
 according to Hepzibah “acknowledged no law and ate no solid food,
 but lived on the scent of other people’s cookery” (84). Nonetheless,
 Holgrave’s profession as an artist betrays his affinity with the Judge.
 In his portraits he
 
is able to fix flux—even  the  varying expression of  
the Judge—to capture the essence of a personality. Holgrave
 
can live  
in the flux and embrace it because, like the Transcendentalists, he
 believes in the artistic individual’s access to fixed, permanent laws.
 Although Holgrave made Phoebe uneasy because he “seemed to
 
17
Thomas: The House of the Seven Gables: Hawthorne’s Legal Story
Published by eGrove, 1987
266
 
HAWTHORNE’S LEGAL STORY
unsettle everything around her, by his lack of reverence for what was
 
fixed,” Hawthorne immediately adds “unless, at a moment’s warning,
 it could establish its right to hold its ground” (177). As Hepzibah says,
 “I suppose he has a law of his own!” (85). While Holgrave’s dislike of
 the Judge shows how
 
the artist’s private law  often conflicts with the  
judge’s public law, his conversion to conservatism at the end of the
 book shows how the artists’ desire to find eternal truths can lead to
 political conservatism.
This mixture of conservatism and radicalism that we find in
 
Hawthorne’s work can be explained in part by the mode of writing by
 which he chooses to present himself to the public—the romance.
 
If, as  
de Tocqueville observed, the discourse of the law at that time
 imparts—or attracts men with a predisposition to—conservative
 “habits of order, a taste for formalities..., [an] instinctive regard for
 the regular
 
connection of ideas, which naturally renders them hostile  
to the
 
revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multi ­
tude,”27 the genre of the romance helps to determine—or is the most
 appropriate mode to express—Hawthorne’s politics. Politicizing the
 generic work
 
of Northrop Frye, Fredric Jameson has argued that the  
romance, by portraying conflict in terms of good and evil felt as
 magical forces, disguises social and historical causes of
 
conflict. Of  
course, Hawthorne’s work, which is not a pure
 
romance but a novel ­
romance, does not completely disguise social and historical causes of
 conflict. As I have argued, it accurately portrays the stages in the
 development of antebellum economic law and through the Pyncheon-
 Maule conflict shows the class struggle involved. Nonetheless, as I
 have also argued, Hawthorne’s fascination with the sensational,
 along with his tendency to personalize
 
and  see social conflict in terms  
of conspiracy, distorts the acute historical analysis that he offers.
Jameson goes on to argue that the precondition for the romance
 
“is to be found in a transitional moment in which two distinct modes
 of production, or moments of socioeconomic development, coexist,”
 such as in antebellum America when market capitalism started to
 replace the old colonial, agrarian order. He adds, however, that “their
 antagonism is not yet articulated in terms of the struggle of social
 classes, 
so
 that its resolution can be projected in the form of a nostalgic  
(or less often, Utopian) harmony.”28
Appropriately, Hawthorne’s resolution of conflicts in The House
 
of the Seven
 
Gables has been read alternatively as nostalgic, Utopian,  
and even
 
ironic.29 It is nostalgic if we  see the return of the property to  
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the Maule family as an
 
idealized reassertion of democratic agrarian  
values, a yearning for a non-existent Edenic past. In this reading,
 Hawthorne’
s
 “romantic” ending reflects the inherent nostalgia in the  
Democratic alternative to Whig elitism. It is Utopian if 
we
 read the  
romance (as Hawthorne tells us to) as offering possible, if not proba
­ble, alternative visions to society and see Holgrave and Phoebe’
s proposed marriage as a destruction of
 
class barriers and a union of  
idealism and practicality, a harmony
 
not yet consummated, but one  
projected for a possible future. It is ironic if we see Hawthorne self
­consciously undercutting his too obviously nostalgic or Utopian
 visions and suggesting, through Holgrave’s conversion to conserva
­tism and Phoebe’s inheritance of a great fortune, that Maule’s curse
 has not ended, but is starting all over again. But whether the ending is
 nostalgic, Utopian, or ironic, it saves the protagonists from confront
­ing the world of commerce with which the rest of Salem
 
has to deal.  
Watching the barouche carry Clifford, Hepzibah, Holgrave, and
 Phoebe to the country home of Judge Pyncheon are two men of the
 street:
“Well, Dixey,” said one of them, “what 
do
 you think  of this? My  
wife kept a cent-shop, three months, and lost five dollars on her
 outlay. 
Old
 Maid Pyncheon has been in trade just about as  long,  
and rides off in her carriage with a couple
 
of hundred thousand-  
reckoning her share, and Clifford’s and Phoebe’s—and some say
 twice as much! If you choose to call it luck, it is all very 
well;
 but if  
we are to take it as the will of Providence, why, I can’t exactly
 fathom it!”
“
Pretty good business!” quoth the sagacious Dixey. “Pretty  
good business!” (318-319)
Once again Jameson’
s
 discussion of the romance can help us  
understand what is at stake in Hawthorne’s artistic retreat from
 business realities. This is Jameson’s description of the end of Joseph
 von Eichendorff's Aus dem Leben eines Taugennichts\
It is because Eichendorff
'
s opposition between good and evil  
threatens so closely to approximate the incompatibility between
 the older aristocratic traditions and the new middle-class life
 situation that the narrative must not be allowed to press to any
 decisive conclusion. Its historical reality must rather be disguised
 and defused by the sense of moonlit revels dissolving into thin air,
 and conceal a perception of class realities behind the phantasma
­goria of Schein and Spiel. But romance does its work well; under
 
19
Thomas: The House of the Seven Gables: Hawthorne’s Legal Story
Published by eGrove, 1987
268 HAWTHORNE’S LEGAL STORY
the spell of this wondrous text, the French Revolution proves to be
 
an
 
illusion, and the grisly class conflict of decades of Napoleonic  
world war fades into the mere stuff of bad dreams.30
So too with The House of the Seven Gables, which transforms the
 
class conflict of antebellum America into an imaginative vision “of
 the writer’s own choosing or creation” (1). Alone with Phoebe in the
 garden, Holgrave exclaims:
Could I keep the feeling that now possesses me, the garden would
 
every day be virgin soil, with the earth’s first freshness in the
 flavor of its beans and squashes; and the house!—it would be like a
 bower in Eden, blossoming with the earliest roses that God ever
 made. Moonlight, and the sentiment in man’
s
 heart, responsive to 
it, is the greatest of renovators and reformers. And all other reform
 and renovation I suppose, will prove to be no better than moon
­shine! (214)
Later, as Holgrave and Phoebe acknowledge their love, they
transfigured earth and made it Eden again, and themselves the
 
first two dwellers in it. The dead man, so close beside them, was
 forgotten. At such a crisis, there is no Death; for Immortality is
 revealed anew, and embraces everything in its hallowed
 atmosphere.
But soon the heavy earth-dream settled down again! (307)
Historical reality is but an earth-dream; the Edenic moment of ro
­
mance, reality.
What our examination of the period’
s
 legal history should let  us  
see is that paradoxically an important aspect of the historical reality
 from which Hawthorne retreats is a market system that made value
 “fictional.” Hawthorne’s attraction to imaginative romances is in
 part a nostalgia for a world in which “true” values would be tangible.
 His Judge Pyncheon is fully aware of how the new economy makes it
 possible
 
to fictionalize one’s “value.” Talking to Hepzibah, the Judge  
describes how his Uncle Jaffrey concealed “the amount of his
 
prop ­
erty by making distant and foreign investments, perhaps under other
 names than his own, and by various means, familiar enough to capi
­talists, but unnecessary here to be specified” (234). The type of wealth
 that Uncle Jaffrey had, though indicated only on paper, was of course
 real, yet Hawthorne, the writer of romances, wants to deny its power
 over him.
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To be sure, it exerts complete power over the most powerful, practi
­
cal man in Salem—Judge Pyncheon. The judge’s pursuit of his uncle’
s missing property focuses on his quest for the deed to the mythical
 Maine land. It becomes his one castle in the air. From Clifford he
 demands “the schedule, the documents, the evidences, in whatever
 shape they exist, of the vast amount of Uncle Jaffrey’s
 
missing prop ­
erty” (235). But by the end of the romance, these documents turn out to
 be utterly worthless. In a
 
legal system that since Charles River Bridge  
no longer upholds the sanctity of contract, the original Indian deed to
 the lands had “long been worthless” (316). It is of course appropriate
 that the secret to the whereabouts of the deed is the one “possession”
 Holgrave inherited from his ancestors. If the secret source of wealth is
 after all fictional, it has been controlled all along by our representative
 writer of romances. The writer controls the paper economy, not vice
 versa. Having arrived at such a vision, Hawthorne can close
 
the book  
on the radical reforms that at first seemed so necessary if the
 
faulty  
foundation of an unjust legal system were to be repaired.
The reader, however, can keep the book open since, despite his
 
conservatism, Hawthorne has exposed contradictions in the legal
 ideology that are not to be dismissed
 
by his  invocation of the special  
privileges of the romancer. Hawthorne’s ability
 
to expose those con ­
tradictions depends to a large extent on the historical perspective he
 offers, a perspective in turn dependent in part on his particular biogra
­phical situation which made him a resident of Salem, a town whose
 historical development allowed it to produce as its
 
most famous judge  
a man whose life traces the transformation of American law even
 more accurately than Hawthorne’s fiction. That famous judge’s invol
­vement in Salem’s most famous murder trial makes his legal bio
­graphy an ideal text to compare to Salem’s most famous writer’s
 fictionalized version of Salem history. Interweaving these texts, we
 are in a better position to understand the
 
ideological implications of  
both
 
Joseph  Story’s view of the law and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s  view  
of art, a view which caused him to invoke the privileges of a romancer
 to retreat from the truly subversive potential of his own legal story.
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